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Abstract
In 1929, Hotelling presented a model for spacial competition between two firms in which they
compete in a two-stage game. First, both firms choose their location and after they choose their
prices. In this work, we assume that the establishment of prices occurs in a dynamic way instead
of a static one. We will use two different dynamics, namely, the Myopic Dynamics and the Best-
Response Dynamics. Our main goal, will be to study the stability of the Nash Price Equilibrium. We
also study the conditions that make the set of prices, for which every firm has a non-empty market
share, a forward invariant set. For last, we will address the extension of the Hotelling model to a
network, proposed by A. A. Pinto and T. Parreira. Again, we assume a dynamic establishment of
prices and our goal is to study the stability of the Nash Price Equilibrium.
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Resumo
Em 1929, Hotelling apresentou um modelo de competição espacial entre duas firmas. Neste
modelo, as firmas competem num jogo com duas etapas. Em primeiro lugar, as firmas escolhem
a sua localização e, em seguida, escolhem o seu preço. Neste trabalho, nós iremos assumir que
a escolha de preços ocorre de forma dinâmica. Iremos usar duas dinâmicas distintas, nomeada-
mente, Myopic Dynamics e Best-Response Dynamics. O nosso objectivo, é estudar a estabilidade
do equilíbrio de Nash em preços. Iremos também estudar as condições que tornam o conjunto
de preços, para os quais as firmas partilham o mercado, num conjunto invariante. Por último,
iremos estudar a extensão do modelo de Hotelling para uma network, proposto por A. A. Pinto
e T. Parreira. De novo, iremos assumir a existência de uma escolha dinâmica de preços. O
objectivo, é estudar a estabilidade do equilíbrio de Nash em preços.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The model of spacial competition, introduced by Hotelling [6], has become an attractive framework
to the study of oligopoly markets (see [5], [2], [13], [8] [1]). Hotelling, in his work, presented a
city where the consumers buy a commodity from one of the two firms available. This city is
represented by a segment line where the consumers are uniformly distributed. The firms, also
located in the segment line, compete in a two-stage game. In first place, both firms choose their
location and, afterwards, each one establishes the price for the commodity. In his first approach,
Hotelling concluded that the firms would have an incentive to establish themselves in the center of
the segment line. However, D`Aspremont et al. [5] showed that Hotelling`s conclusion is invalid.
In this work, we will focus in the second stage of the Hotelling model by introducing a dynamical
component. We consider that the firms continuously adjust the price of the commodity, instead of
fixing the prices. Our goal is to study the stability of the Nash Price Equilibrium and the forward
invariance of the Duopoly Zone. In addition, we intend to gain an insight in how the price of the
commodity and market share of each firm varies with time. We will study the Hotelling model with
different transportation and productions costs for both firms. We will utilize two different dynamics
for the second sub game, namely, the Myopic Dynamics and the Best-Response Dynamics [9].
A. A. Pinto and T. Parreira [2], presented a model of an Hotelling town that generalizes the Hotelling
model to a network, where the consumers and the firms are located. Like in the original Hotelling
model, the consumers buy a single commodity from one of the firms available. In addition, the
consumers are uniformly distributed along the edges of the network, also called roads. The firms
compete, again, in a two stage game, choosing the location in the first sub game and the price
9
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of the commodity in the second sub game. A. A. Pinto and T. Parreira introduced a condition,
linking transportation costs, production costs and the topology of the network, that guarantees the
existence of a Nash equilibrium in the price sub game.
In the last chapter of this work, we study the stability of the Nash Price Equilibrium in the Hotelling
Network, assuming, that every firm adjusts is price accordingly to the principles of the Myopic
Dynamics.
Chapter 2
Basics of Game Theory and Dynamics
In this chapter, we will introduce some concepts of Game Theory and Differential Equations, that
will be necessary in the rest of the text. Since the results are well known, some of them are
presented without proof, but, in such cases, a reference is provided.
We will start by doing a brief introduction to differential equations and qualitative analyses.
2.1 Qualitative Analyses of Differential Equations
A system of differential equations in Rn is given by a group of linked differential equations8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
dx1
dt = f1(t; x1; : : : ; xn)
dx2
dt = f2(t; x1; : : : ; xn)
: : :
dxn
dt = fn(t; x1; : : : ; xn)
(2.1)
where each of the functions fi is defined in a open subset U of Rn, fi is real valued and at least
C0. The system 2.1 can be written in the abbreviated form
X ` = F (t;X)
where X = (x1; : : : ; xn) and F (t;X) = (f1(t;X); : : : ; fn(t;X)), commonly referred to as a vector
field. If the system does not depend explicitly of the variable t, then we refer to it as an au-
11
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tonomous system. We say that X(t;XI) is a solution for system 2.1, with initial condition XI ,
if
X `(t) = F (t;X)
and
X(0;XI) = XI :
It is not guarantee, from the start, that such a solution exists or even if it is unique. An answer for
this problem is given by the Theorem of Existence and Uniqueness of Solution (see [10]).
2.1.1 Stability
Definition 1. A point X0 2 Rn is an equilibrium point for a system of differential equations if
F (t;X0) = 0 :
Now, we introduce a key notion in qualitative theory, that is the stability of an equilibrium point.
Definition 2. Let X0 2 Rn be an equilibrium point for a system of differential equations:
• X0 is stable if
– for all " > 0 there exists  > 0 such that, if XI 2 B(X0; ) then X(t;XI) 2 B(X0; ") for
all t 2 R+.
• otherwise, X0 is unstable.
• X0 is asymptotically stable if X0 his stable and
– there exists  > 0 such that, if XI 2 B(X0; ) then X(t;Xi)! X0 as t! +1.
Informally, an equilibrium point X0 is stable, if a solution for the system that starts close of X0,
remains close toX0, for all positive t. The pointX0 is asymptotically stable if it is stable and if there
exists a neighborhood ofX0, where the solution of the system converges toX0. A general method
for investigating the stability of a fixed point was introduced by Lyapunov.
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Definition 3. Let X0 be an equilibrium point for a system of differential equations X ` = F (t;X)
where F : U  Rn+1 ! Rn. A function V : D  Rn+1 ! R is a Lyapunov function for the above
system if:
• D is a open subset of Rn+1 and X0 2 D  U .
• V (X0) = 0 and V (X) > 0 for all X 2 D   fX0g.
• (V (X))`  0 for all X 2 D   fX0g.
If the last condition is strict then V is a strict Lyapunov function .
Theorem 1. Let X0 be an equilibrium point for a system of differential equations, X ` = F (t;X)
where F : U  Rn+1 ! Rn.
• If there exists a Lyapunov function for the system then the equilibrium point is stable.
• If the Lyapunov function is strict then the equilibrium point is asymptotically stable.
A proof of this result can be seen in [10]. In the particular case where the system is autonomous,
and all of the functions fi are affine, there exists a more direct way for proving the stability of an
equilibrium point.
Theorem 2. Let X ` = F (X) be a system of differential equations where F : U  Rn+1 ! Rn is an
affine vector field and X0 is an equilibrium point. Consider the matrix A that allows the system to
be written as Y = AY + R and let fi : 1  i  ng be set of eigenvalues of A. If jij < 0, for all
1  i  n, then X0 is asymptotically stable.
Another notion that will play a key role in this work, is the notion of a forward invariant set.
Definition 4. Let   be a subset of Rn and X(t;XI) a solution of a system of differential equations.
The set   is forward invariant if for all t  0 and for all XI 2  
X(t;XI)    :
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2.1.2 Lotka-Voterra Differential Equations
Now, we make an introduction a well-known class of differential equations called Lotka-Volterra.
The most common example of a Lotka-Volterra type equation is the predator-prey equation pro-
posed by Vito Volterra. This equation is given by8><>:
dx
dt = x(a  by)
dy
dt = y( c+ dx) :
(2.2)
This equation models the dynamics of interacting populations of predators y and preys x . The
parameters a and c represent the intrinsic growth of the respective species, while the parameters
b and d represent the effect that one population has on the other population. We are interested in
the generalization of this equation for an arbitrary number of species.
Definition 5. The general Lotka-Volterra type equation, for n populations, is of the form
dxi
dt
= xi(ri +
nX
j=1
aijxj) : (2.3)
The coefficients ri represent the intrinsic growth of the population i and the parameter aij describe
the impact of the j-th population upon the i-th population. The matrix A = (aij) is often called the
interaction matrix.
This equation has a non-trivial equilibrium point, x = (x1; : : : ; xn), determined by the linear system
nX
j=1
aijxj =  ri : (2.4)
If for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng the components xi satisfy xi > 0 we call this equilibrium point feasible.
Furthermore if A is non-singular then x exists and is unique.
Definition 6. LetA be a symmetric matrix of dimension nn and real entries. A is called negative
definite if all of its eigenvalues are negative. Equivalently, symmetric matrix A is negative definite
if
xTAx < 0
for all non-zero x in Rn.
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There are a number of results regarding the dynamic behavior of this type of differential equation
(see for example [7]). In this work, we concentrate our attention in a result proved in 1977 by
Goh [4] regarding the stability of a feasible fixed point of this type of differential equations.
Theorem3. Assume that the general Lotka-Volterra equation has feasible fixed point x = (x1; : : : ; xn).
In addition, assume that the interaction matrix A is non-singular. If there exists a constant positive
diagonal matrix C, such that, CA + ATC is negative definite then x is asymptotically stable with
a Lyapunov function given by
V =
nX
n
ci[xi   xi   xi ln(xi/xi )] :
Proof. Assume that exists a positive diagonal matrix C = (c1; : : : ; cn), such that, CA + ATC is
negative definite. The function
V =
nX
i=1
ci[xi   xi   xi ln(xi/xi )]
has a global minimum at (x1; : : : ; xn).
Using 2.4, the derivative of this function computed along the solutions of equation 2.3 is given by
dV
dt
(X) =
nX
i=1
ci(x1   xi )(
dxi/dt
xi
)
=
nX
i=1
ci(xi   xi )(ri +
nX
j=1
aijxj) by 2.4
=
nX
i=1
ci(xi   xi )
nX
i=1
aij(xj   xj )
=
1
2
(x  x)T (CA+ATC)(x  x) :
Since CA + ATC is negative definite then dVdt (X) is negative, for all x 6= x, and V is indeed a
Lyapunov function for 2.3 which concludes the proof.
This insights regarding Lotka-Volterra equations will be particularly useful in Chapter 4 and 6. The
last result of this section, is a theorem proved by Gershgorin (see [15]) concerning the eigenvalues
of an arbitrary matrix.
Theorem 4. Let A be a matrix with dimension n  n. Then all of its eigenvalues lie into, at least,
one of the discs
D(aii; Ri) = j  aiij  Ri (2.5)
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where Ri =
Pn
j 6=i jaij j.
In the next section, we introduce some useful concepts of Game Theory.
2.2 Basics in Game Theory
The field of Game Theory started from very sporadic considerations, made by authors like E.
Zermelo [16], E. Borel [3] or Steinhaus [14], to a widely considered approach to economic theory.
Most of this path was walked by John Von Neuwman and Oskar Morgenstern, a collaboration which
ultimately led to the publication of the book entitled Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Later
on, John Nash gives his contribution to the theory of non cooperative games (see [11]). He was
awarded with the Nobel Prize in Economics and since then many more have won this prize for their
contributions in this area.
Informally a game can be described as a set of players, who are matched, to take some actions,
chosen from a given set. An utility function is attached to every player, that determines his utility,
given a combination of actions, taken by all the players. The objective of each player is to maximize
his utility function.
Definition 7. A game is described by the quadruple
G =< I;M; (Si)i2I ; (i)i2I >
where:
1. I = f1; 2; : : : ; ng is the set of types of players;
2. M = fm1;m2; : : : ;mng specifies the number of players for type i;
3. for every i 2 I, Si is the closed set of strategies (or actions) for each player type;
Defining mj(i) = mj if j 6= i and mi(i) = mi   1 the function
i : j2ISmj(i)j  Si ! R
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i(s i; si) = i((s11; : : : ; s
m1
1 ; : : : ; s
mn
1 ; : : : ; s
mn
n ); si)
represents the utility obtained by the player i when he plays si and the other players play the
combination of strategies s i.
Keep in mind that a player objective, in any game, is to maximize his utility function, thus the next
logical step is to know the strategy or strategies that maximizes the utility function, given the other
players strategies.
Definition 8. Given a game G and a vector of strategies si,
BRi(s i) = argmaxsi2Si(s i; si)
is the set of best response strategies for player i given the combination of actions s i taken by
the other players.
Let BR(S) = (BR1(s 1); : : : ; BRi(s i); : : :). We note that the set BR() might not define a best
response function, because BR() might be only a correspondence between strategies. Now, we
state one of the most important concepts in Game Theory, the Nash Equilibrium.
Definition 9. A strategy vector x 2 j2ISmj(i)j  Si is a Nash Equilibrium if
x 2 BR(x) :
Example 1. A classical example of a game is the so called Prisoner`s Dilema.
Suppose that two members of a criminal gang are caught by the police and that the prosecutors
do not have enough evidences to convict the pair on the charges. In order to solve this problem
they put the criminals in different rooms, and simultaneously they offer them the following deal:
• Betray the other criminal, by testifying that they have committed the crime. (B)
• Stay silent. (S)
Formally, we define this game by having two players f; g of the same type with a discrete set of
strategies, namely fB;Sg. The payoffs are summarized in table 2.1.
FCUP 18
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;  B S
B (1,1) (0,3)
S (0,3) (2,2)
Table 2.1: Utilities for the Prisoner`s Dilemma.
Each pair (i; j), of table 2.1, means that the players , will get i and j years in jail, respectively,
when they play the corresponding strategies. The Best-Response correspondence is
BR(B) = S
BR(S) = S
BR(B) = S
BR(S) = S
Hence, it follows that the Nash Equilibrium is the pair of strategies (S; S) were each of the criminals
gets two years in jail. Interestingly, if the players choose to play (B;B) each of them would only get
one year in jail, which is better than what they gain by playing (S; S). This is a canonical example,
were pure "rational" behaviors, in the sense that players only try to maximize their utilities, might
not lead to the best choices.
Definition 10. Given a game G, we say that the players are choosing their strategies accordingly
to the Best-Response Dynamics if
dsi
dt
2 BR(s i)  si (2.6)
where BR(s i) denotes the Best-Response Correspondence of player i given the strategies of
all the other players.
This Best-Response Dynamics was introduced by Matsui [9]. We note that equation 2.6 does not
necessarily define a differential equation since BR() may only be a correspondence and not a
function. A big number of results concerning the Best Response Dynamics have been proven for
general games. A simple result linking the Best-Response Dynamics to the Nash Equilibrium is
the following.
Definition 11. Given a game G =< I;M; (Si)i2I ; (i)i2I > then S is a Nash Equilibrium if, and
only if, S is an equilibrium point for the Best-Response Dynamics.
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In the case of the Hotelling model that we analyze in this thesis, the Best-Response Dynamics thus
in fact define a differential equation. Our objective, is to use the tools exposed in the last section
to investigate the stability of the Nash Equilibrium. We will also investigate the asymptotically
properties of the solutions in order to obtain some economical insight. This field of Game Theory
is normally referred to as Evolutionary Game Theory.
Chapter 3
Hotelling Model
In 1929, H. Hotelling [6] introduced a spacial model of a competition between two firms. In this
model firms are located along a segment line of given length l and sell the same commodity at
prices pA and pB respectively. The consumers are uniformly distributed along the line and buy one
unity of product at each unit of time. The price P payed by the consumers is given by the price at
which they buy the commodity, pA or pB, plus a transportation cost per unit of distance. We will
consider that this transportation cost can be different, tA or tB, depending of the firm where the
consumer buys the product. We consider that each firm has a unitary production cost cA and cB
corresponding to the price the firms pay per one unity of the commodity. From the point of view of
game theory there are two sub games to be considered in this model, first the firms choose their
location and afterwards the firms choose their prices. In this work, we will mainly concentrate on
the price sub game assuming that the firms are located in the extremes of the line.
3.1 Indifferent Consumer and Profit
In a game the goal of the players is to maximize their utility, with this fact in mind is logic to consider
that the firms will try to sell their product at the highest price possible. On the other hand, each
consumer will buy at the firm that guaranties him the lowest price P . Now, we introduce the
indifferent consumer that is important to determine the profits of both firms. If both firms have a
non-empty market share the indifferent consumer x is the consumer who pays the same price
20
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for the commodity whether he buys at firm A or firm B, that is
pA + tAx = pB + tB(l   x) : (3.1)
If the firm A supplies the whole market then the indifferent consumer is taken to be x = l. On other
hand if the firm B supplies the whole market then the indifferent consumer is taken to be x = 0.
Figure 3.1: Hotelling Model Diagram
Lema 1. Given a price configuration (pA; pB) the indifferent consumer is given by
x(pA; pB) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
l if pB   pA  tAl
pB pA+tB l
tA+tB
if   tBl < pB   pA < tAl
0 if pB   pA   tBl :
(3.2)
Proof. In the computation of x there are three cases to consider:
1. The firm A supplies the whole market;
2. Both firms have a non-empty market share, that is 0 < x < l;
3. The firm B supplies the whole market;
Suppose that firm A supplies the whole market then the price payed by the consumer located in
the end of the line satisfies
pA + tAl  pB :
If firm B supplies the whole market then the consumer located in the beginning of the line satisfies
pB + tBl  pA :
FCUP 22
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If both firm are sharing the market then the indifferent consumer satisfies
pA + tAx = pB + tB(l   x) : (3.3)
Solving for x, we obtain
x =
pB   pA + tBl
tA + tB
: (3.4)
In this case x satisfies 0 < x < l and so
 tBl < pB   pA < tAl :
Since we are interested that both firms have a non empty market share, that is 0 < x < l, we
introduce the following definition of the Duopoly Property.
Definition 12. A price configuration (pA; pB) satisfies the Duopoly Property if, and only if,
 tBl < pB   pA < tAl : (3.5)
We observe that pA  cA and pB  cB to guarantee have a non-negative profit. The definition
of indifferent consumer allows us to define the profit functions for the Hotelling game. Observe
that the indifferent consumer x(pA; pB) represents the numbers of consumers that buy on firm A.
Therefore the profit of a firm A is given by its profit margin pA  cA times the number of consumers
x(pA; pB) that buy at firm A. Hence,
A = A(pA; pB) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
(pA   cA)l if pA  pB   tAl
(pA cA)(pB pA+tB l)
tA+tB
if   tBl < pB   pA < tAl
0 if pA  pB + tBl :
(3.6)
The reasoning behind the profit of firm B is analogous, however, we need to have in consideration
that the number of clients, in this case, is given by l   x(pA; pB). Hence,
B = B(pA; pB) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
(pB   cB)l if pB  pA   tBl
(pB cB)(pB pA+tB l)
tA+tB
if   tBl < pB   pA < tAl
0 if pB  pA + tAl :
(3.7)
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3.2 The Duopoly Zone
The Duopoly Property in conjunction with pA  cA and pB  cB, allows us to give a geometric
interpretation of the set of price configurations, for which, the firms are sharing the market. From
now on, we refer to this set of prices as Duopoly Zone. Hence, figure 3.2 represents one of the
Figure 3.2: Duopoly Zone
possible shapes of the Duopoly Zone. The horizontal and vertical boundaries of the Duopoly Zone
are given, respectively, by the sets
Bh = f(pA; cB) : pA  cA and (pA; cB) has Duopoly Property g (3.8)
Bv = f(cA; pB) : pB  cB and (cA; pB) has Duopoly Property g (3.9)
On other hand, the superior and inferior diagonal boundaries of the Duopoly Zone are represented,
respectively by
Bs = f(pA; pB) : pB = pA + tAl and pA > cAg (3.10)
Bi = f(pA; pB) : pB = pA   tBl and pB > cBg (3.11)
We note that above the boundary Bs, the firm A supplies the whole market and the indifferent
consumer is x = l. Below the boundaryBi, the firmB supplies the entire market and the indifferent
consumer is x = 0.
Let cB   cA be denoted by c.
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There are three possibilities for the shape of the Duopoly Zone depending upon the following
inequalities:
1.  tBl < c < tAl;
2. c   tBl;
3. c  tAl;
In the first case, point (cA; cB) has the Duopoly Property. Hence, the Duopoly Zone has the shape
represented by figure 3.2. In the second case, point (cA; cB) belongs to the boundaryBi or is below
the boundary the Bi. Figure 3.3 represents the shape of the Duopoly Zone in case 2. The last
(a) Case c =  tBl (b) Case c <  tBl
Figure 3.3: Shape of the Duopoly Zone in Case 2
case is symmetric to case 2 and point (cA; cB) belongs to the boundary Bs or is above boundary
Bs. Figure 3.4 represents the shape of the Duopoly Zone in the last case.
(a) Case c = tAl (b) Case c > tAl
Figure 3.4: Shape of the Duopoly Zone in Case 3
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We observe that, in cases 2 and 3 one of the firms has an advantage in the competition. In case
2, the firm B can throw firm A out of the market without having to lower its price to values near
its production cost. In case 3, the advantage belongs to firm A, who can throw firm B out of the
market without having to lower its price near its production cost.
As a final note, we make a remark regarding the lines with slope one located inside the Duopoly
Zone. Along these lines, the market share of each firm remains constant. If the firms start, at some
point, to collaborate they can raise the prices by the same amount changing their market-shares.
From the consumer point of view this is not good, because they can end paying a lot more for the
product. So this discussion justifies the introduction of mechanisms to protect the consumer from
this possible firm cooperation, specially in markets where the commodity being sold is essential.
Chapter 4
Best-Response Dynamics
In this chapter, our objective is to find the Best-Response Dynamics for the Hotelling Model. First
of all, we need to focus our attention in finding the Best-Response Correspondence of each of
the firms. Since the profit functions are similar for both firms, we concentrate in finding the Best-
Response Correspondence for firm A.
4.1 Dynamics
We recall that the profit A is given by
A = A(pA; pB) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
(pA   cA)l if pA  pB   tAl
(pA cA)(pB pA+tB l)
tA+tB
if   tBl < pB   pA < tAl
0 if pA  pB + tBl :
(4.1)
The second branch of the profit function is a concave quadratic function in pA, with zeros given by
pA = cA and pA = pB+ tBl. Consequently, admits a maximum point for pA = pB+tB l+cA2 . However,
this point may not be the global optimum for A. We are going to show that the form and maximum
of A will depend on the relative position in the line of the four possible maximum candidates,
cA; pB + tBl;
pB + tBl + cA
2
; pB   tAl : (4.2)
Let us suppose, that the smaller value is pB + tBl then, we obtain that pB + tBl  pB   tAl.
This is an absurd, since the transportation costs are positive and not necessarily equally. On the
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other hand, consider that the smaller value is pB+tB l+cA2 then, we obtain that
pB+tB l+cA
2  cA and
pB+tB l+cA
2  pB + tBl. This is an absurd since pB+tB l+cA2 is the middle point between cA and
pB + tBl. Therefore, there are only two cases:
• Case A, where pB   tBl is the smallest maximum candidate in 4.2.
• Case B, where cA is the smallest maximum candidate in 4.2.
Consider Case A:
There are two hypothesis for the relative position of the maximum candidates in 4.2.
• Case A1
pB   tAl  cA  pB + tBl + cA
2
 pB + tBl : (4.3)
• Case A2
pB   tAl  pB + tBl  pB + tBl + cA
2
 cA : (4.4)
In figure 4.1, we show, in Case A1, the graphic representation of A. From the graphic represen-
Figure 4.1: Shape of A in Case A1
.
tation of A in Case A1, is possibly to verify that, given a price pB, the profit of firm A is maximum
when pA = pB+tB l+cA2 , that is
arg max A(pA; pB) =
pB + tBl + cA
2
: (4.5)
Consider Case A2:
Consider figure 4.2. In this picture it is represented the profit of firm A in this case. The profit will
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be zero independently of the price set by firm A, so the maximum profit is achieved at pA = cA and
arg max A(pA; pB) = cA : (4.6)
Figure 4.2: Shape of A in Case A2
Consider Case B:
Again, we end up with two possibilities.
• Case B1
cA  pB + tBl + cA
2
 pB   tAl  pB + tBl : (4.7)
• Case B2
cA  pB   tAl  pB + tBl + cA
2
 pB + tBl : (4.8)
Figure 4.3: Shape of A in Case B1
Consider Case B1:
The figure 4.3 shows the graphic representation of A in this case. In this picture, we can verify
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that, given pB, the profit of firm A is maximum at pA = pB   tA, that is
arg max A(pA; pB) = pB   tAl : (4.9)
Consider Case B2:
Figure 4.4: Shape of A in Case B2
The picture 4.4 shows, that if pB satisfies Case B2, then firm A achieves is maximum profit by
setting is price at pB+tB l+cA2 and
arg max A(pA; pB) =
pB + tBl + cA
2
: (4.10)
The above discussion leaves us in position to compute the Best-Response Correspondence for
firm A.
Theorem 5. The Best-Response Correspondence for firm A, BrA(pB), is:
BrA(pB) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
pB   tAl if pB  cA + tBl + 2tAl
pB+cA+tB l
2 if cA   tBl < pB < cA + tBl + 2tAl
cA if pB  cA   tBl :
Proof. Given a price pB, it was already shown that there are four different cases for the shape of
firm`s A profit function. The four cases can be joined, accordingly to the point where the global
maximum is achieved. We end up with three groups:
• Case B1 - A as a global maximum at pA = pB   tAl.
• Case B2 and Case A1 - A as a global maximum at pA = (pB + tBl + cA)/2.
• Case A2 - B as a global maximum at pA = cA.
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Case B1 is characterized by
cA  pB + tBl + cA
2
 pB   tAl  pB + tBl :
Since pB   tAl  pB + tBl and that (pB + tBl+ cA)/2 is the middle point between cA and pB + tBl,
we obtain that Case B1 is also defined by the system of inequalities given by8><>:
cA  pB + tBl
pB  cA + tBl + 2tAl :
Since pB  cA + tBl + 2tAl implies cA  pB + tBl then Case B1 is fully characterized only by the
first inequality.
Therefore, if pB  cA + tBl + 2tAl then
arg max A(pA; pB) = pB   tAl :
Case A2 is characterized by
pB   tAl  pB + tBl  pB + tBl + cA
2
 cA :
Again, considering that pB tAl  pB+tBl and since, (pB+tBl+cA)/2 is the middle point between
cA and pB + tBl, we obtain that Case A2 is also fully characterized by
pB + tBl  pB + tBl + cA
2
:
With some computations, we verify that Case A2 is characterized only by
pB  cA   tBl :
Therefore, if pB  cA   tBl then
arg max A(pA; pB) = cA :
Consider now Case B2 and Case A1 characterized by
cA  pB   tAl  pB + tBl + cA
2
 pB + tBl
or
pB   tAl  cA  pB + tBl + cA
2
 pB + tBl :
31 FCUP
Dynamics in Hotelling based Models
For the same reasons pointed in the previous cases, we verify that Case B2 and Case A1 are
characterized by
cA   tBl  pB  cA + tBl + 2tAl :
Hence,
arg max A(pA; pB) =
pB + tBl + cA
2
:
By symmetry, we set the Best-Response Correspondence for firm B.
Theorem 6. The Best-Response Correspondence for firm B, BrB(pA), is given by
BrB(pA) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
pA   tBl se pA  cB + 2tBl + tAl
pA+cB+tAl
2 cB   tAl < pA < cB + 2tBl + tAl
cB se pA  cB   tAl :
Recall the definition of the Best-Response Dynamics given in chapter 1. As a corollary of the last
two theorems we set the main result of this section.
Corollary 1. In the Hotelling model, the Best-Response Dynamics is given by
dpA
dt
=
8>>>>><>>>>>:
pB   tAl   pA if pB  cA + tBl + 2tAl
pB 2pA+cA+tB l
2 if cA   tBl < pB < cA + tBl + 2tAl
cA   pA if pB  cA   tBl
dpB
dt
=
8>>>>><>>>>>:
pA   tBl   pB if pA  cB + 2tBl + tAl
pA 2pB+cB+tAl
2 if cB   tAl < pA < cB + 2tBl + tAl
cB   pB if pA  cB   tAl :
The Best-Response Dynamics separates the set of price configurations into nine different regions.
• Region A11 given by [0; cB   tAl] [0; cA   tBl].
• Region A12 given by [cB   tAl; cB + tAl + 2tBl] [0; cA   tBl].
• Region A13 given by [cB + tAl + 2tBl;+1[[0; cA   tBl].
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• Region A21 given by [0; cB   tAl] [cA   tBl; cA + 2tAl + tBl].
• Region A22 given by [cB   tAl; cB + tAl + 2tBl] [cA   tBl; cA + 2tAl + tBl].
• Region A23 given by [cB + tAl + 2tBl;+1[[cA   tBl; cA + 2tAl + tBl].
• Region A31 given by [0; cB   tAl] [cA + tBl + 2tAl;+1[.
• Region A32 given by [cB   tAl; cB + tAl + 2tBl] [cA + tBl + 2tAl;+1[.
• Region A33 given by [cB + tAl + 2tBl;+1[[cA + tBl + 2tAl;+1[.
Figure 4.5 shows the prices partition in these regions. Recall that the dynamical equilibrium points
Figure 4.5: Partition of the Price Configurations Set
of the Best-Response Dynamics are the Nash equilibrium points. We can find the Nash Price
Equilibrium using the above prices partition.
Theorem 7. In the Hotelling model, there exists a Nash Price Equilibrium with Duopoly Property
if, and only if,
 2tBl   tAl < c < 2tAl + tBl :
In addition, it is unique and is located in Region A22.
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Proof. In Region A11 the equilibrium point is given by8><>:
cA   pA = 0
cB   pB = 0 :
Consequently, (cA; cB) is an equilibrium point for the system. However, this point is not necessarily
located inside Region A11. In fact, (cA; cB) is only located in this zone if, and only if,
cA  cB   tAl and cB  cA   tBl;
which is absurd, hence there are no equilibrium points in this zone. Utilizing similar arguments, we
conclude that in Regions A12,A13,A21,A23,A31,A32 and A33 there are no equilibrium points for the
Best-Response Dynamics.
Consider Region A22. The equilibrium points are given by8><>:
pB 2pA+cA+tB l
2 = 0
pA 2pB+cB+tAl
2 = 0 :
Therefore, the equilibrium point is
P  =

2cA + cB + 2tBl + tAl
3
;
2cB + cA + 2tAl + tBl
3

:
This point falls inside Region A22 if, and only if,
cB   tAl < 2cA+cB+2tB l+tAl3 < tAl + 2tBl + cB
cA   tBl < 2cB+cA+2tAl+tB l3 < 2tAl + tBl + cA :
Hence, there exits a Nash Price Equilibrium if, and only if,
 2tBl   tAl < c < 2tAl + tBl : (4.11)
We only need to verify, that under the above condition, this Nash Price Equilibrium has Duopoly
property. In fact, the indifferent consumer at P  satisfies
0 < x(P ) < l :
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4.2 Stability of the Nash Price Equilibrium
In this section, we proceed under the assumption that the Nash Price Equilibrium exists. The first
question we want to answer, regarding the price evolution under the Best-Response Dynamics is:
• Consider that the initial prices are sufficiently close to the Nash Price Equilibrium, which are
the trajectories followed by the prices?
This question is mathematically corresponds to study of the stability of an equilibrium point, pre-
sented in chapter 2.
Theorem 8. The only Nash Price Equilibrium point
P  =

2cA + cB + 2tBl + tAl
3
;
2cB + cA + 2tAl + tBl
3

is asymptotically stable.
Proof. Inside Region A22 the Best-Response Dynamics can be written as0@ dpAdt
dpB
dt
1A =
0@ 1 12
1
2  1
1A0@pA
pB
1A+
0@ cA+tB l2
cB+tB l
2
1A
Hence, the Best-Response Dynamics in Region A22 is affine. The system matrix has two negative
eigenvalues, 1 =  12 and 2 =  32 . This implies that the Nash Price Equilibrium is asymptotically
stable.
Theorem 8 does not imply that, for every initial condition inside the Duopoly Zone or even Region
A22, the price trajectory will converge into the equilibrium point. Since the Best-Response Dynam-
ics is defined taking into account different zones of the plane, at this point, we can only guarantee
that exists an open set of price configurations around the Nash Price Equilibrium, for which the
price trajectory will converge to the equilibrium point.
4.3 Invariance of the Duopoly Zone
The question we want to answer in this section is:
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• Given a price a configuration in the Duopoly Zone, does any of the firms ends with an empty
market share?
Mathematically, we address this question as follows:
• Is the Duopoly Zone a forward invariant set for the Best-Response Dynamics?
First we state a result about the invariance of the set of prices given by [cA;+1[[cB;+1[.
Lema 2. The set of prices, defined by [cA;+1[[cB;+1[, is a forward invariant set for the Best-
Response Dynamics.
Proof. The proof of this result follows directly from the fact that the Best-Response Correspon-
dence never drops bellow cA for firm A and bellow cB for firm B. The direction of the vector field
along pA = cA is fully characterized by the sign of dpA/dt. This derivative is given by
dpA
dt
=
8>>>>><>>>>>:
pB   tAl   cA if pB  cA + tBl + 2tAl
pB cA+tB l
2 if cA   tBl < pB < cA + tBl + 2tAl
0 if pB  cA   tBl :
Therefore, dpA/dt  0 along the line pA = cA. This implies that a solution of the Best-Response
Dynamics never crosses the line pA = cA. A similar argument allows to prove that a solution of the
Best-Response Dynamics never crosses the line pB = cB. The combination of these two results
proves the claim of the lema.
Lema 2 has a very acceptable and expected economic interpretation. Given any initial price
configuration, non of the firms has an advantage in dropping the price bellow their respective
production cost.
We also observe, that theorem 2 implies that a solution of the Best-Response Dynamics, with
initial condition inside the Duopoly Zone, never leaves this zone by the boundaries Bh and Bv.
The next result determines sufficient conditions for the invariance of the Duopoly Zone under the
Best-Response Dynamics.
Theorem 9. If a Nash Price Equilibrium with Duopoly Property exists, then the Duopoly Zone is a
forward invariant set for the Best-Response Dynamics.
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Proof. To prove this theorem, we only need to prove, that if a Nash Price Equilibrium with Duopoly
Property exists then the Best-ResponseDynamics vector field points inwards, along the boundaries
Bs and Bi of the Duopoly Zone. Now, by Corollary 1 the components of the vector field along Bs
are given by
dpA
dt
=
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 if pA  cA + tBl + tAl
 pA+cA+tB l+tAl
2 if cA   tBl   tAl < pA < cA + tBl + tAl
cA   pA if pA  cA   tBl   tAl
and
dpB
dt
=
8>>>>><>>>>>:
 tBl   tAl if pA  cB + 2tBl + tAl
 pA+cB tAl
2 if cB   tAl < pA < cB + 2tBl + tAl
cB   pA   tAl if pA  cB   tAl :
We will study, separately, three different cases:
1.  tBl < c < tAl.
2.  2tBl   tAl < c   tBl.
3. tAl  c < 2tAl + tBl.
Consider that  tBl < c < tAl. The following relation of order is satisfied
cA   tBl   tAl  cB   tAl  cA  tBl + tAl + cA  tAl + 2tBl + cB :
The last inequality divides the line pB = pA + tAl in six segments, where different branches of the
Best-Response Dynamics are valid. The vector field along those segments is given by:
1. if pA 2] 1; cA   tBl   tAl] then8><>:
dpA
dt = cA   pA
dpB
dt = cB   pA   tAl :
2. if pA 2]cA   tBl   tAl; cB   tAl] then8><>:
dpA
dt =
 pA+cA+tAl+tB l
2
dpB
dt = cB   pA   tAl :
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3. if pA 2]cB   tAl; cA] then 8><>:
dpA
dt =
 pA+cA+tAl+tB l
2
dpB
dt =
 pA+cB tAl
2 :
4. if pA 2]cA; cA + tBl + tAl] then 8><>:
dpA
dt =
 pA+cA+tAl+tB l
2
dpB
dt =
 pA+cB tAl
2 :
5. if pA 2]cA + tBl + tAl; tAl + 2tBl + cB] then8><>:
dpA
dt = 0
dpB
dt =
 pA+cB tAl
2 :
6. if pA 2]tAl + 2tBl + cB;+1[ then 8><>:
dpA
dt = 0
dpB
dt =
 pA+cB tAl
2 :
Considering that Bs is limited by pA = cA, we only need to consider the last three cases. If pA 2
]tAl+2tBl+cB;+1[ or pA 2]cA+tBl+tAl; tAl+2tBl+cB], the first component of the vector field is
zero, therefore the vector field point inwards if, and only if, dpB/dt  0. If pA 2]tAl+2tBl+cB;+1[
we obtain
dpB
dt
=  (tA + tB)l < 0 ;
and the vector field points inwards. If pA 2]cA + tBl + tAl; tAl + 2tBl + cB] and since pA  cA, we
obtain
dpB
dt
=
 pA + cB   tAl
2
) dpB
dt
 c  tAl
2
:
Therefore, under the condition  tBl < c < tAl, we obtain that dpB/dt < 0 and the vector field
points inwards.
Finally, consider that pA 2]cA; cA + tBl + tAl]. Under the condition  tBl < c < tAl we obtain
dpB
dt
=
 pA + cB   tAl
2
) dpB
dt
 c  tAl
2
:
FCUP 38
Dynamics in Hotelling based Models
If pA is between cA and cA + tAl + tBl we obtain
dpA
dt
=
 pA + cA + tAl + tBl
2
) dpA
dt
 0 :
This implies that Best-Response Dynamics vector field points inwards along the boundary Bs.
A similar argument, allows to prove that the Best-Response Dynamics vector field, also points
inwards in the case where  2tBl   tAl < c   tBl and tAl  c < 2tAl + tBl. By symmetry,
the Best-Response Dynamics vector field, also points towards the interior of the Duopoly Zone
along the boundary Bi. Since, a solution of the Best-Response Dynamics never crosses the lines
pA = cA and pB = cB, the prove follows.
The fact that the Duopoly Zone is a forward invariant set for the Best-Response Dynamics brings
very interesting consequences from the economic point view. First of all, if a Nash Price Equilibrium
with Duopoly Property exists, non of the firms has an incentive to supply the whole market. This
behavior makes the market very resistant to fluctuations resulting from outside factors. Facing an
unexpected fluctuation in the market share a firm never drops out the market as long it keeps a
tiny number of customers.
In the last discussion, we were assuming that the difference between production costs allows the
existence of a Nash Price Equilibrium with Duopoly Property. It is also interesting to investigate
the firm interaction in the case where such an equilibrium does not exist. From Theorem 7, we
know that the Nash Price Equilibrium with Duopoly Property does not exist if, and only if,
c  2tAl + tBl or c   2tBl   tAl :
Lema 3. Consider that c  2tAl + tBl. Then the Duopoly Zone only intersects the Regions A32
and A33. If c   2tBl   tAl, then the Duopoly Zone only intersects the Regions A23 and A33.
Proof. Let c  2tAl + tBl. Then the boundary Bh is empty and the Duopoly Zone is limited by
the boundary Bh. Under the considered condition, we obtain that
cB  cA + 2tAl + tBl :
Therefore, the Duopoly Zone can only intersect the Regions A31, A32 and A33. Consider the
intersection point between the boundary pA = cB   tAl of the Region A31 and the boundary Bs
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of the Duopoly Zone. This point is given by (cB   tAl; cB). Hence, (cB   tAl; cB) is the only point
of Region A31 that could belong to to the Duopoly Zone. However, (cB   tAl; cB) does not have
Duopoly Property and (cB   tAl; cB) does not belong to the Duopoly Zone.
By symmetry the second part of the lema follows.
The above lema, allows us to search for equilibrium points of the Best-Response Dynamics under
the considered conditions.
Theorem 10. Let c  2tAl + tBl. There exists a Boundary Nash Price Equilibrium given by
P 1 = (cB   tAl; cB)
that belongs to the common boundary between the Regions A31 and A32.
Let c   2tBl   tAl. There exists a Boundary Nash Price Equilibrium given by
P 2 = (cAl; cA   tBl)
that belongs to the common boundary between the Regions A13 and A23.
Proof. Consider c  2tAl + tBl. By lema 3 the Duopoly Zone only intersects the Regions A32
and A33. The intersection point P I = (pIA; cB) between the boundaries Bh and Bs of the Duopoly
Zone is given by the equation
cB = p
I
A + tAl :
Hence,
P I = P 1 = (cB   tAl; cB) :
This implies that P 1 lies in the common boundary between the Regions A31 and A32. Since
the Best-Response Dynamics vector field is continuous we can use the expression of the Best-
Response Dynamics in the Region A32 to show that P 1 is an equilibrium point. We obtain that
in P 1 the components dpA/dt and dpB/dt of the Best-Response Dynamics are zero and P 1 is an
equilibrium point. The second part of the theorem follows by a symmetrical argument.
We note that neither P 1 or P 2 have Duopoly Property. In the price configuration P 1 the firm A is
supplying the entire market. On the other hand, in the price configuration P 2 the firm B is the firm
who supplies the entire market.
The next result classifies the equilibrium points P 1 and P 2 in terms of stability.
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Theorem 11. The equilibrium points P 1 and P 2 of the Best-Response Dynamics are asymptotically
stable. Furthermore,
• P 1 attracts every solution of the Best-Response Dynamics with initial conditions inside the
Region A32
• P 2 attracts every solution of the Best-Response Dynamics with initial conditions inside the
Region A23.
Proof. Let P 1 be an equilibrium point for the Best-Response Dynamics. By lema 3 and having into
account that the Best-Response Dynamics vector field is continuous, the matrix of the system is
given by
A =
0@ 1 1
1
2  1
1A : (4.12)
Computing the eigenvalues of A, we obtain that 1 =  1 1/
p
2 and 2 =  1+1/
p
2. Hence, both
eigenvalues of A are negative and P 1 is asymptotically stable. In fact, since the Best-Response
Dynamics is affine the point P 1 attracts every solutions of the vector field with initial conditions
inside the Region A32. A symmetrical allows to prove the claims of the theorem regarding P 2 .
Theorem 12. The equilibrium points P 1 and P 2 of the Best-Response Dynamics are global attrac-
tors within the Duopoly Zone. Furthermore, the solutions of the Best-Response Dynamics never
leave the Duopoly Zone in finite time.
Proof. Consider that P 1 exists. The theorem 11 shows that P 1 attracts every solution of the Best-
Response Dynamics with initial conditions inside the region A32. To prove that P 1 is a global
attractor within the Duopoly Zone is only necessary to show that the solution of the Best-Response
Dynamics, with initial condition inside the Region A33, enters in the Region A32 at some point.
Consider the Best-Response Dynamics in the Region A33. Consider the inner product given by
(
dpA
dt
;
dpB
dt
):( 1; 1) : (4.13)
With some computations, we obtain that the above inner product is constant an equal to
(tA + tB)l (4.14)
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Hence, the inner product in equation 4.13 is always positive. Therefore, the Best-Response
Dynamics solutions, with initial conditions in the RegionA33, enter the RegionA32 for some positive
t. We recall, that by theorem 2 a solution of the Best-Response Dynamics never drops below the
line pB = cB. Therefore, P 1 is a global attractor within the Duopoly Zone.
To conclude the prove of the theorem it is necessary to show that the solutions of the Best-
Response Dynamics, with initial conditions inside the Regions A32 or A33, don`t cross the bound-
aries Bs and Bi of the Duopoly Zone. This can be done by computing the inner product between
the vector ( 1; 1) and the Best-Response Dynamics vector field along the boundaries Bs and Bi
in the Regions A32 and A33.
Region A32:
The inner product between the vector ( 1; 1) and the Best-Response Dynamics vector field along
Bs is given by
(0;
 pB + cB
2
) =
 pB + cB
2
: (4.15)
Hence, the above inner product is equal to zero when pB = cB and below zero otherwise. There-
fore, the Best-Response Dynamics vector field point towards the inside of the Duopoly Zone. The
inner product between the vector ( 1; 1) and the Best-Response Dynamics vector field along Bi
is given by
( (tA + tB)l;  pB + cB + tAl + tBl
2
) =
 pB + cB + 3tAl + 3tBl
2
: (4.16)
The maximum value of pB in Region A32 is cA + 2tAl + tBl. Therefore, the minimum of the above
inner product is
c+ 2tBl + tAl :
If P 1 exists, thenc  2tAl+ tBl. Hence, the inner product, given by equation 4.16 is greater than
zero and the Best-Response Dynamics vector field points towards the inside of the Duopoly Zone.
Region A33:
The inner product between the vector ( 1; 1) and the Best-Response Dynamics vector field along
Bs is given by
(0; (tA + tB)l):( 1; 1)) =  (tA + tB)l : (4.17)
Hence, the Best-Response Dynamics vector field points towards the inside of the Duopoly Zone.
The inner product between the vector ( 1; 1) and the Best-Response Dynamics vector field along
Bi is given by
( (tA + tB)l; 0):( 1; 1) = (tA + tB)l : (4.18)
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Hence, the Best-Response Dynamics vector field points towards the inside of the Duopoly Zone.
The above discussion shows that a solution of the Best-Response Dynamics, with initial conditions
inside the Duopoly Zone, converges to P 1 and never leaves in finite time the Duopoly Zone.
The above discussion shows, that when a interior Nash Price Equilibrium does not exist, then one
of the firms ends supplying the entire market.
In the next chapter, we will introduce a different dynamics in the second sub game of the Hotelling
model. Our goal, is to see, into what extend, the conclusions draw for the Best-ResponseDynamics
hold for a new dynamics.
Chapter 5
Myopic Dynamics
In this chapter we introduce a dynamics called Myopic Dynamics, given by8><>:
dpA
dt = (pA   cA)@A@pA
dpB
dt = (pB   cB)@B@pB :
(5.1)
The idea behind this dynamics is fairly simple. In first place, a firm never has the incentive to drop
below their respective production costs. With this in mind, we introduce the components (pA cA),
(pB   cB) in equation 5.1. The terms @A/@pA and @B/@pB have the function of characterizing
the impact, on the firm`s profit, caused by their own prices. The idea is the following: if a positive
fluctuation in the price causes a decrease in the profit of a firm then the firm lowers its price in an
attempt to increase market share; On other hand, if a positive fluctuation in the prices leads to an
increase in the profit of the firm then the firm raises its price, not minding with the loss of market
share.
We call this dynamics Myopic Dynamics, in the sense that, a firm only looks to the instantaneous
variation of its profit. In the Hotelling model, we consider the Myopic Dynamics to be valid in the
closure of the Duopoly Zone.
In chapter 3 we introduced the Duopoly Property Condition,
 2tBl   tAl < c < 2tAl + tBl :
Under the Duopoly Property Condition the indifferent consumer is located inside the Duopoly Zone
so the firms are sharing the market. In addition, we prove in the last chapter, that under this
43
FCUP 44
Dynamics in Hotelling based Models
condition, the Nash Price Equilibrium exists and it is given by
(pA; p

B) =
1
3
(2cA + cB + (tA + 2tB)l; cA + 2cB + (2tA + tB)l) : (5.2)
The next proposition links the Myopic Dynamics and the equilibrium point in equation 5.2.
Proposition 1. Under Duopoly Property Condition, the Myopic Dynamics has the following equi-
librium points:
• a corner equilibrium point (cA; cB).
• two boundary equilibrium points (cA; cA+cB+tAl2 ) and (
cA+cB+tB l
2 ; cB).
• an interior equilibrium point that is the Nash Price Equilibrium.
Proof. Solving for the fixed points (dpAdt ;
dpB
dt ) = (0; 0), we obtain
(pA   cA) = 0 _ pB   2pA + cA + tBl
tA + tB
= 0
and
(pB   cB) = 0 _ pA   2pB + cB + tAl
tA + tB
= 0 :
Therefore, the differential equation has three equilibrium points located on the edges of the duopoly
zone. Namely, (cA; cB), (cA; cA+cB+tAl2 ) and (
cA+cB+tB l
2 ; cB). The interior equilibrium point is given
by 8><>:
pB 2pA+cA+tB l
tA+tB
= 0
pA 2pB+cB+tAl
tA+tB
= 0 :
Solving the system we obtain
(pA; p

B) =
1
3
(2cA + cB + (tA + 2tB)l; cA + 2cB + (2tA + tB)l) :
There are two economical questions that we want to answer:
• Is the Nash Price Equilibrium asymptotically stable?
• Can a firm, under the Myopic Dynamics, lose its market share ?
We present two simulations for the price evolution with two different set`s of parameters.
In both cases, shown in figure 5.1, the price trajectory converges to the Nash Price Equilibrium.
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Figure 5.1: Myopic Dynamics simulations.
5.1 Stability of the Nash Price Equilibrium
We are going to show that the Nash Price Equilibrium is asymptotically stable using a Lyapunov
function. We note, however, that the asymptotically stability, could be shown, by computing the
eigenvalues of the linearization of system 5.1, in a neighborhood of the Nash Price Equilibrium. We
opted by the traditional method to be consistent with the exposition made in chapter 6, in which,
we apply this method to a more complex problem. Consider the change of coordinates given by
the transformation
(x; y) = (pA   cA; pB   cB) : (5.3)
Remembering that cB   cA is represented by c, we write equation 5.1 in the new coordinate
system, 8>><>>:
dx
dt = x(
y 2x+tB l+c
tA+tB
)
dy
dt = y(
x 2y+tAl c
tA+tB
) :
(5.4)
In chapter 2, we introduced a special class of differential equations called Lotka-Volterra type
equations. For two populations and an interaction matrix given by A = (aij), the general form
of this equations is given by
8>><>>:
dx1
dt = x1(r1 + a11x1 + a12x2)
dx2
dt = x2(r2 + a21x1 + a22x2) :
(5.5)
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Hence, equation 5.4 is a Lotka-Volterra differential equation with an interaction matrix A given by
A =
0@  2tA+tB 1tA+tB
1
tA+tB
 2
tA+tB
1A : (5.6)
This identification allow us to use the result, presented in chapter 2, regarding this type of equations.
Theorem 13. The Nash Price Equilibrium is an asymptotically stable equilibrium point for the
Myopic Dynamics.
Proof. According with, theorem 3 [4] from chapter 2, if exists a positive diagonal matrix C such
that CA+ATC is negative definite, then the feasible equilibrium point of a Lotka-Volterra equation
with interaction matrix A is asymptotically stable. After the appropriated coordinate change and
under the Duopoly Property Condition, the Nash Price Equilibrium is feasible since all of entries
are positive. Consider the positive diagonal matrix C given by
C =
0@1 0
0 1
1A :
Computing CA+ATC, we obtain
CA+ATC = 2A =
0@  4tA+tB 2tA+tB
2
tA+tB
 4
tA+tB
1A
The above matrix has two negative eigenvalues, namely, 1 =  2tA+tB and 2 =
 6
tA+tB
. Therefore
is negative definite. This concludes the prove and the Nash Price Equilibrium is asymptotically
stable.
5.2 Invariance of the Duopoly Zone
At this point, we know that there are a set of initial prices in a neighborhood of the Nash Price
Equilibrium, such that, the price trajectories converge towards the Nash equilibrium point. The
second question we want to answer is, considering a initial price configuration inside the Duopoly
Zone, will any of the firms have an incentive to cut off the other firm and supply the whole market?
This question will be answered, by finding under which conditions, in terms of the production costs
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and the transportation costs, is the duopoly zone a forward invariant set. As a first approach to
this question, we address the dynamic behavior of the Myopic Dynamics along the boundaries Bh
and Bv of the Duopoly Zone. Having into account the considerations made in chapter 2, we note
that Bh and Bv can be empty sets. Therefore, there are three cases that we must address:
• Case 1: where  tBl < c < tAl, which implies that both Bv and Bh are non-empty.
• Case 2: where c   tBl, which implies that Bh is empty.
• Case 3: where tAl  c, which implies that Bv is empty.
The next theorem addresses Case 1.
Theorem 14. If  tBl < c < tAl, the solutions of Myopic Dynamics with initial conditions inside
the sets Bv   (cA; cB) and Bh  (cA; cB) converge, respectively, to the following equilibrium points:
1. P 1 = (cA; cA+cB+tAl2 ) and the stable manifold is Bv.
2. P 2 = ( cA+cB+tB l2 ; cB) and the stable manifold is Bh.
The figure 5.2 shows a graphic representation of the claims made in the above theorem.
Figure 5.2: Stability along Bh and Bv in Case 1
Proof. If tBl < c < tAl, the sets Bh (cA; cB) and Bv (cA; cB) are both non empty. Computing
the Myopic Dynamics along the boundary Bv, we obtain8><>:
dpA
dt = 0
dpB
dt = (pB   cB) cA 2pB+cB+tAltA+tB :
(5.7)
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We note that, because dpA/dt is null, the solutions of the Myopic Dynamics with initial conditions
on the line pA = cA do not leave this line. The derivative dpB/dt is a concave parabola with zeros
pB = cB and pB = cA+cB+tAl2 . Since, we are assuming that c < tAl and having into account that
 = (cA; cA + tAl) is the interception point between the boundaries Bv and Bs, we obtain that
cB <
cA + cB + tAl
2
< cA + tAl : (5.8)
Hence, dpB/dt has:
• positive sign in the segment ]cB; cA+cB+tAl2 [.
• negative sign in the segment ] cA+cB+tAl2 ; cA + tAl].
Therefore, the solution of the Myopic Dynamics converges to P 1 . Applying a similar argument
regarding the boundary Bh, we obtain that the solution of the Myopic Dynamics converges to
P 2 .
We now move to Case 2. In this case the set Bh is empty, therefore we only address the behavior
of the Myopic Dynamics for initial conditions on the boundary Bv.
(a) For  2tBl   tAl < c   tBl (b) For c <  2tBl   tAl
Figure 5.3: Stability along Bv in Case 2
Theorem 15. If  2tBl  tAl < c   tBl, the solutions of Myopic Dynamics, with initial conditions
inside the set Bv, converge to the equilibrium point
P 1 = (cA;
cA + cB + tAl
2
) ;
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and the stable manifold is Bv. If c <  2tBl   tAl, the solutions of the Myopic Dynamics, with
initial conditions in the set Bv, leave the Duopoly Zone.
The figure 5.3 shows a graphic scheme of the claims made in the last theorem.
Proof. First suppose that c <  2tBl  tAl. From the computation of the Myopic Dynamics along
the line pA = cA, we know that P 1 and (cA; cB) are the only two possible equilibrium points, to
which a solution, with initial condition in Bv can converge. To prove the claim made in the theorem
it is only necessary to note that neither P 1 or (cA; cB) has Duopoly Property.
Now, suppose that  2tBl   tAl < c   tBl. Consider the point  = (cA; cA   tBl), that is
the intersection point between pA = cA and the boundary Bi. Again, from the computation of the
Myopic Dynamics along the line pA = cA we know that dpB/dt is a concave parabola with zeros
pB = cB and pB = cA+cB+tAl2 . Under the assumed condition we obtain
cB  cA   tBl < cA + cB + tAl
2
< cA + tAl : (5.9)
Hence, dpBdt has:
• positive sign in the segment [cA   tBl; cA+cB+tAl2 [.
• negative sign in the segment ] cA+cB+tAl2 ; cA + tAl].
Therefore, in this case, the solution of the Myopic Dynamics converges to P 1 .
We observe, that ifc <  2tBl tAl, then the solutions of Myopic Dynamics can leave the Duopoly
Zone. This shows, that in general, the Duopoly Zone is not a forward invariant set for the Myopic
Dynamics. In Case 3, we have a symmetric result to theorem 15.
Theorem 16. If tAl  c < 2tAl+ tBl, the solutions of the Myopic Dynamics, with initial conditions
inside the set Bh, converge to the equilibrium point
P 2 = (
cA + cB + tBl
2
; cB) ;
and the stable manifold is Bh. If c > 2tAl+ tBl, the solutions of Myopic the Dynamics, with initial
conditions in the set Bh, leave the Duopoly Zone.
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The proof of the above theorem is similar to theorem`s 15 proof. The next figure shows the graphic
representation of the claims made in the last theorem. Again, we observe that the Duopoly Zone
(a) For tAl  c < 2tAl + tBl (b) For c > 2tAl + tBl
Figure 5.4: Stability along Bh in Case 3
might not be a forward invariant set for the Myopic Dynamics. This implies, that under certain
conditions, a firm may drive the other firm out of the market. However, it is possible to encounter
conditions, linking production costs and transportation costs, that make the Duopoly Zone a forward
invariant set.
Theorem 17. The Duopoly Zone is a forward invariant set for the Myopic Dynamics if, and only if,
the production costs satisfy
 3tBl   tAl
2
 c  3tAl + tBl
2
: (5.10)
Proof. To prove that the Duopoly Zone is a forward invariant set for the Myopic Dynamics, we have
to show that the vector field along the segments Bs and Bi points inwards. The vector field along
Bs points inwards if, and only if, his projection on the vector (1; 1) is greater or equal to zero, that
is
(
dpA
dt
;
dpB
dt
):(1; 1)  0 : (5.11)
On other hand, the vector field along Bi points inwards if, and only if, his projection on the vector
(1; 1) is less or equal to zero, that is
(
dpA
dt
;
dpB
dt
):(1; 1)  0 : (5.12)
To simplify the computations, we apply the coordinate change presented in equation 5.3. In this
new coordinate system the sets Bs and Bi become, respectively:
• Bcs = f(x; y) : y = x+ tAl  c and x  0g :
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• Bci = f(x; y) : x = y + tBl +c and y  0g :
In first place, we focus in the set Bcs. Computing the Myopic Dynamics along Bcs we obtain8><>:
dx
dt =
x( x+tAl+tB l)
tA+tB
dy
dt =
 (x+tAl c)2
tA+tB
:
(5.13)
Computing (dx/dt; dy/dt):(1; 1) we obtain
l(x)  (dx
dt
;
dy
dt
):(1; 1) = x(3tAl + tBl   2c) + (tAl  c)2 : (5.14)
Hence, l(x)  0 for all x  0 if, and only if, the slope is equal or greater than zero, that is
c  3tAl + tAl
2
: (5.15)
Proceeding in the same way for the inferior boundary, we obtain that the Myopic Dynamics vector
field computed along Bci is given by 8><>:
dx
dt =
 (y+tB l+c)2
tA+tB
dy
dt =
y( y+tAl+tB l)
tA+tB
:
(5.16)
Computing (dpA/dt; dpB/dt):(1; 1) we obtain
l2(y)  (dx
dt
;
dy
dt
):(1; 1) = y(3tBl + tAl + 2c)  (tBl +c)2 : (5.17)
Hence, l2(y)  0 for all y  0 if, and only if, the slope is equal or lesser than zero, that is
c  3tBl + tAl
2
: (5.18)
Combining the conditions 5.15 and 5.18, we obtain that the Myopic Dynamics vector field along
the sets Bs and Bi points inwards if, and only if,
 3tBl   tAl
2
 c  3tAl + tBl
2
: (5.19)
Hence, we know that a solution for Myopic Dynamics, in the conditions of the theorem, can only
leave the Duopoly Zone by the boundaries Bv and Bh. However, by theorems 15 and 16, this
happens if and only if c > 2tAl + tBl or c <  2tBl   tAl. Since the set of solutions of the
inequalities 5.19, c > 2tAl + tBl and c <  2tBl   tAl are disjoint, the proof of the theorem
follows.
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Note that, the Duopoly Property Condition is not sufficient to guarantee that the Duopoly Zone is
forward invariant. Therefore, it is possible to exist a Nash Price Equilibrium, with Duopoly Property,
without the Duopoly Zone being a forward invariant set. This implies that the Nash Price Equilibrium
with Duopoly Property is not always achievable. Hence, under the Myopic Dynamics, one firm
may have the incentive to supply the entire market. In this sense, the proof of theorem 17 brings
interesting consequences from the economic point of view. If the Duopoly Zone is not a forward
invariant set, then, only one of the firms is at risk of being driven off from the market. If c >
3tAl+tB l
2 , then firm B is the only firm at risk of be driven out of the market. This occurs because a
solution of Myopic Dynamics can only leave the Duopoly Zone by the boundary Bs. On the other
hand, if  <  3tB l tAl2 firm A is the only firm at risk of being driven off the market. In this case a
solution of Myopic Dynamics can only leave the Duopoly Zone by the boundary Bi.
5.3 Myopic Dynamics vs Best-Response Dynamics
The use of the Best-Response Dynamics or the Myopic Dynamics leads to the same conclusion
about the stability of the Nash Price Equilibrium, that is, the Nash equilibrium point is asymptot-
ically stable. The forward invariance of the Duopoly Zone, however, is affected by the choice of
dynamics. In the Myopic Dynamics, it is possible to exist a Nash Price Equilibrium, with Duopoly
Property, without the Duopoly Zone being forward invariant. This implies, that the Nash Price
Equilibrium might not be achievable. This occurs, because in the Myopic Dynamics, the firm only
have into consideration the instantaneous variation of their profits. In opposition, with the Best-
Response Dynamics, if a Nash Price Equilibrium with Duopoly Property exists then the Duopoly
Zone is forward invariant. This conclusion implies, that under the Best-Response Dynamics the
market is much more stable.
Chapter 6
Hotelling Network
In this chapter, we consider the extension of the Hotelling model to a network of consumers and
firms. This model was introduced by A. A. Pinto and T. Parreira in [2].
6.1 Model Overview
The Hotelling network consists of a group of roads or edges, denoted by R, where the consumers
are uniformly distributed. Each road with vertices i and j, denoted by Rij , has length lij . A group
of firms F is distributed along the network and sell the same commodity. Similarly to the Hotelling
model, each firm Fi sells the commodity at price pi and supports a unitary production cost ci.
The consumers, in addition to the price of the commodity, have to support a transportation cost
ti depending of the firm Fi where each buys the commodity. Therefore, a consumer located at a
point x in the network, who decides to buy at firm Fi spends
E(x; i; P ) = pi + tid(x; yi) ; (6.1)
where P = (p1; : : : ; pi; : : :) is a price configuration and d(x; yi) represents the distance between
the position of the consumer x and the position yi of firm Fi in the network.
Given a price configuration P , the consumer will choose to buy at the firm Fi that minimizes its
expenditure
v(x; P ) = argmini2VE(x; i; P ) : (6.2)
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Again, in this model, it is assumed that each consumer buys one unity of commodity for each unity
of time.
The market of each firm Fi is the set of all the consumers who minimize their expenditures by
opting to buy at firm Fi,
M(i; P ) = fx : v(x; P ) = ig :
The market size Si(P ) of firm Fi is given by the Lebesgue measure of the set M(i; P ). Therefore,
the profit of each firm Fi, is given by
i(P; ci) = (pi   ci)Si(P ) : (6.3)
In this work, we will assume that every firm is located at one vertex of the network, that is, each
firm Fi is located at the vertex i of the network. The local firms of a consumer, located in the road
Rij , are the firms Fi and Fj .
Figure 6.1: Example of Hotelling Network
Definition 13. A price configuration P , determines a Local Market Structure if every consumer
buys from one of his local firms.
A price strategy P determines a Local Market Structure if, and only if, for every road Ri;j there is
one consumer located at a point xi;j 2 Ri;j who is indifferent to the local firm from which he is
going to buy the commodity, that is
E(x; i; P ) = E(x; j; P ) : (6.4)
Lema 4. A price configuration determines a Local Market Structure for every road Rij if, and only
if, the following inequality is satisfied,
 tjlij < pj   pi <  tilij : (6.5)
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Figure 6.2: Indifferent Consumer in Hotelling Network
Proof. A price strategy P determines a Local Market Structure if, and only if, for every road Ri;j
there is one consumer located at a point xi;j 2 Ri;j , such that
pi + tixij = pj + tj(lij   xij) : (6.6)
Solving for xij , we obtain that
xij =
pj   pi + tjlij
ti + tj
: (6.7)
Since xij satisfies 0 < xij < lij , we obtain that
 tjlij < pj   pi < tilij : (6.8)
From now on, we refer to the inequality given by equation 6.5 as the Local Market Structure
Condition. Assuming that jF j = n, we observe that the Local Market Structure Condition defines
a zone in Rn similar to the Duopoly Zone defined in R2 by the Duopoly Property. We denote this
zone by Local Market Structure Zone.
Inside of the Local Market Structure Zone, the location of the indifferent consumer, xij , defines the
size of the market, in the road Rij , that belongs to firm Fi and firm Fj . This markets are given by
xij and lij   xij , respectively.
Let Vi denote the vertices j such that exists a road Rij . Inside of Local Market Structure Zone,
every road as an indifferent consumer, therefore, the size of the market, Si(P ), owned by the firm
Fi, is given by X
j2Vi
xij : (6.9)
This allows us to define the profit function of each firm Fi,
i(P; ci) = (pi   ci)
X
j2Vi
xij : (6.10)
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The next definition introduces an important condition to the existence of Nash Price Equilibrium.
Consider the following notation:
• cM (resp. cm) denotes the maximum (resp. minimum) of the production costs of all the firms
in F .
• tM (resp. tm) denotes the maximum (resp. minimum) of the transportation costs for all the
firms in F .
• kM (resp. km) denotes the maximum (resp. minimum) degree of all the vertices in the
network.
• c, t and k represent, respectively, cM   cm, tM   tm and kM   km.
Definition 14. An Hotelling network satisfies Strong Bounded Length and Costs Condition
(SBLCC) if, and only if,
c+
lM t
2
M
tm
  lmtm +tlM  (2lmt
2
m  ctm)2
4t2M lMkM (tm + tM )
: (6.11)
It was proven, by A. A. Pinto and T. Parreira (see [12]), that if a Hotelling network satisfies SLBCC,
then a Nash Price Equilibrium exists inside the Local Market Structure Zone. In addition, this
equilibrium point is unique. In the same work, A. A. Pinto and T. Parreira showed that the Nash
Price Equilibrium point is determined by the system
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
@1
@p1
= 0
: : :
@i
@pi
= 0
: : :
(6.12)
We denote the Nash Price Equilibrium by P . In the next section, we will study the stability of
the Nash Price Equilibrium assuming that the firms adjust their prices according with the Myopic
Dynamics.
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6.2 Myopic Dynamics in the Hotelling Network
Following the same reasoning presented in chapter 3, the Myopic Dynamics for the Hotelling
network is generally given by 8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
dp1
dt = (p1   c1)@1@p1
: : :
dpi
dt = (pi   ci)@i@pi
: : :
(6.13)
Again, each firm Fi only has into consideration the instantaneous variation of its profit i caused
by its own price pi. Since the Nash Price Equilibrium P  is determined by system 6.12, we obtain
that P  is an equilibrium point for the Myopic Dynamics.
Computing @i/@pi for every firm Fi, we obtain
@i
@pi
=
X
j2Vi
pj   pi + tjlij
ti + tj
  (pi   ci)
X
j2Vi
(ti + tj)
 1 : (6.14)
Consider the coordinate change given by the system8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
x1 = (p1   c1)
: : :
xi = (pi   ci)
: : :
(6.15)
The derivative @i/@pi can be written asX
j2Vi
xj
ti + tj
  2jVijxi
ti + tj
+
X
j2Vi
cj   ci
ti + tj
: (6.16)
Hence, every equation of the Myopic Dynamics can be written has
@i
@pi
= xi(
X
j2Vi
xj
ti + tj
  2jVijxi
ti + tj
+
X
j2Vi
cj   ci
ti + tj
) : (6.17)
The system of equations 6.17 is of Lotka-Volterra type. The interaction matrixA = (aij) of equation
6.17 is given by
aij =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
  2jVijti+tj if i = j
1
ti+tj
if j 2 Vi
0 if j /2 Vi
(6.18)
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We observe, that matrix A is symmetric and therefore non-singular. Let us denote by P c , the
Nash Price Equilibrium P  written in the coordinate system given by system 6.15. Now, we are in
conditions to utilize theorem 3, presented in chapter 2, to address the stability of the Nash Price
Equilibrium P .
Theorem 18. Let P  be a Nash Price Equilibrium, such that, P c is a feasible equilibrium point for
equation 6.17. Then P  is asymptotically stable.
The above result generalizes the theorem, obtained in chapter 5, regarding the stability of the Nash
Price Equilibrium in the Hotelling Model, under the Myopic Dynamics.
Proof. Consider the identity matrix I 2 Rn  Rn. Since AT = A we obtain
C = IA+AT I = 2A (6.19)
Hence, every ij-entry of matrix C is given by
cij =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
  4jvijti+tj if i = j
2
ti+tj
if j 2 Vi
0 if j /2 Vi
(6.20)
The matrix C is symmetric, which implies that all of its eigenvalues are real. By the Gershgorin
theorem, presented in chapter two, every eigenvalue lies in at least one of the discs with center aii
and radius Ri = 2jVijti+tj . For every i, we obtain that
  4jVij
ti + tj
+Ri < 0: (6.21)
Therefore, all eigenvalues of C are negative and C is negative definite, which implies that P c
is asymptotically stable. Since the coordinate change, given by system 6.15, does not affect the
stability of a equilibrium point, we obtain that the Nash Price Equilibrium P  is asymptotically stable.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
In this work, we introduced a dynamical factor in the price sub game of the Hotellingmodel. In chap-
ter 4, using the Best-Response Dynamics, we showed that, under Duopoly Property Condition, the
Nash Price Equilibrium is an asymptotically stable equilibrium point. Economically, this implies the
existence of a set of initial prices, from which, the Best-Response Dynamics converge towards the
Nash Price Equilibrium. We introduced the definition of Duopoly Zone, that is, the set of prices
at which both firms have a non-empty market share. Under the Best-Response Dynamics we
concluded, that the Duopoly Zone is forward invariant when a Nash Price Equilibrium with Duopoly
Property exists. Hence, non of the firms is at risk of having a non-empty market share.
In chapter 5, we introduced the Myopic Dynamics, in which, the firms only have into consideration
the instantaneous variation of their profits. Under the Myopic Dynamics, we were able to replicate
the result above obtained with the Best-Response Dynamics. Again, the Nash Price Equilibrium
is asymptotically stable. However, when we extend our analyses to the Duopoly Zone the results
were quite different. Under the Myopic Dynamics the Duopoly Zone might not be forward invariant.
Economically, this conclusion implies that one firm may end with an empty market share. We were
able to find, however, a condition, linking transportation costs and production costs, that implies
that the Duopoly Zone is forward invariant, and consequently, non of the firms will end with an
empty-market share.
In chapter 6, we analyzed the stability of the Nash Price Equilibrium for the Hotelling Network
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introduced by A. A. Pinto and T. Parreira [2]. Under conditions that guarantee the existence of
a Nash Price Equilibrium, we conclude that, under Myopic Dynamics, this equilibrium point is
asymptotically stable.
7.2 Future Work
In his article from 1979 [5], D`Aspremont noted that the location sub game has a major effect on the
indifferent consumer computation. In fact, this article redefined the conclusions, previous made by
Hotelling, regarding the best strategy in the location game.
There are important open questions, regarding the effects of the locations chosen by the firms , on
the stability of the Nash Price Equilibrium and the Duopoly Zone:
• What effect has the location game on the Duopoly Zone?
• Will the Nash Price Equilibrium still be asymptotically stable for the Myopic Dynamics and
the Best-Response Dynamics?
• What happens to the price trajectory with initial condition in the Duopoly Zone?
Regarding the Hotelling Network model there are even more question to address, for example:
• Is the Nash Price Equilibrium asymptotically stable for the Best-Response Dynamics?
• Is the Duopoly Zone a forward invariant set?
• Which are the localization effects on the dynamical conclusions?
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